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evolving historiographical perspectives 
The issue of violence committed behind the lines on Republican and Francoist territory 
during the Spanish Civil War burns at the heart of the memory wars currently being 
fought in Spanish society over the meanings of the country’s recent, traumatic past. In 
the academic sphere, debate amongst historians regarding the causes and meanings of 
violence carried out against and among the civilian population during the conflict is 
more strongly present and more heated than ever before. Today, historians who wish to 
tackle the subject of this violence still find themselves faced with the task of unpicking 
and challenging the Manichean narratives of the conflict’s meaning established by the 
Franco Dictatorship and reinforced by it for four decades. The regime’s official history 
portrayed the Civil War as a simple battle between good and evil, between the patriotic, 
Catholic saviours of Spain and the barbaric, atheistic, foreign enemies who had attacked 
them. The emphasis on collective forgetting which underlay the post-1975 transition to 
democracy, a process grounded in strong institutional continuity between the Franco 
regime and Spain’s democracy-under construction, has allowed many elements of this 
interpretive framework to survive into the present day.1  
The analytical challenges posed by the survival of Francoist narratives are 
perhaps felt most keenly by those scholars who seek to understand the roughly 50,000 
killings carried out in the Republican zone following the military coup of July 1936. For 
almost four decades, the Dictatorship honoured and celebrated those killed as the 
martyred victims of atheist barbarity, of the ‘anti-Spain’. The fact of their deaths was 
used by Franco propagandists and religious personnel to justify an illegal coup against a 
democratically elected government, to legitimate the Franco war effort, and to construct 
an image of both the pre-war and wartime Second Republic as a hotbed of anarchy, 
lawlessness, killing and destruction.2 This enduring representation ignored the reality 
that the conditions which allowed the wave of revolutionary violence to occur were 
created by the fragmentation of Republican state power provoked by the coup itself.3 
Furthermore – and perhaps most damagingly for current scholars of the violence – it 
ignored both the long term, structural causes of the violence and the identities of the 
perpetrators themselves, all of whom were subsumed into the general descriptive 
category of the ‘atheistic red hordes’. 4   
Since the 1980s, historians inside and outside Spain have been working to 
dismantle these distorted Francoist narratives regarding violence in both zones during 
the Civil War. The period following the transition up to the present has witnessed the 
appearance of an avalanche of volumes written on Francoist violence by both academic 
and non-academic historians. The subject of repression in the Republican zone, 
meanwhile, has received far less attention. This imbalance has its roots in historical 
circumstance. When Spain began to take its first, faltering steps towards 
democratisation after November 1975, progressive historians were acutely aware that a 
vast amount of literature had already been produced on the subject of the ‘red terror’ by 
the Franco regime, its supporters and representatives of the Catholic Church. Spain’s 
foremost specialist on violence on Republican territory, José Luis Ledesma, has 
identified 489 studies on the subject published between 1936 and 1975, 96 per cent of 
which were propagandistic and martyrological works.5 The memory of the ‘martyrs’ of  
violence in the Republican zone was used throughout the life of the dictatorship – but 
especially during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s - as a tool in the brutal forging and 
legitimation of the Francoist State and national community.  
In contrast to this ‘omnipresent image of the martyrs’, Francoist violence behind 
the lines and the brutal repression of those branded as members of the ‘anti-Spain’ 
during 1940s and early 1950s – which had caused the deaths of around 150,000 people 
- was conspicuously and predictably absent from the regime’s official version of 
history.6 This state of affairs meant that in 1975, tens of thousands of the victims of 
Francoist violence had still not been located, identified or commemorated - a situation 
which persists into the present. Faced with this gaping quantitative and qualitative 
historiographical imbalance, progressive historians understandably concentrated their 
efforts on analysing Francoist violence.7  
One of the unfortunate results of this dearth of detailed empirical work on the 
theme of repression in the Republican zone, understandable as it was, was that 
historians sympathetic to the Republic and to its wartime plight tended to generalise 
the violence as a spontaneous, largely meaningless phenomenon carried out by 
criminals and ‘uncontrollable elements’ in the wake of the complete collapse of the 
Republican state.8  The birth of the image of the incontrolado, which was at times 
uncomfortably close to the bloodthirsty mobs and wicked rabbles conjured up by 
Francoist and ecclesiastical propaganda, was also caused by a collective reluctance 
amongst progressive historians to tackle a phenomenon that had caused deep 
embarrassment to the Government of the Second Republic and besmirched its 
reputation, especially on the international stage. 
 Today, following decades of meticulous and extremely necessary research by 
historians into Francoist killings, empirically rigorous and conceptually adventurous 
academic studies on violence in the Republican zone are now appearing in growing 
numbers. The new historians of this repression propose differing interpretations of the 
violence and write from divergent political perspectives. However, they share one key 
goal: that of breaking down the unhelpful image of the incontrolado in order to uncover 
the identities of the perpetrators and understand the logics which drove their violent 
actions.9 Their work builds on the foundations laid by the few detailed and reflexive 
studies on the topic which appeared during the 1980s and 1990s, 10 and also on Paul 
Preston’s The Spanish Holocaust, the most thoroughly catalogued account of violence 
committed behind the lines of both sides during the Spanish Civil War published to date, 
and the final product of decades of painstaking research.11 A number of historians, 
including one of the contributors to a recent forum published in the Journal of 
Contemporary History have suggested that efforts to understand the deeply-rooted 
causes of violence on Republican territory are in fact tantamount to ‘justifying and 
excusing revolutionary violence.’12 However, a detailed examination of recently-
published work on violence in the Republican zone shows that its authors do not seek to 
‘justify’ the violence or to exonerate the Republic from responsibility for it, but to 
explain why and how it happened.  
The British historian Chris Ealham has made pioneering attempts to unravel this 
‘why and how’ in his rigorous grassroots studies of the intersections between working-
class lived experience, state repression and anarchist ideology in early twentieth-
century Barcelona. Ealham roundly rejects the image of the incontrolado. Instead, his 
analysis of 1936’s violence demonstrates that repressive acts in the Catalan capital were 
generally committed by locally-recruited armed revolutionary groups composed of 
activists from the principal pre-Civil War anti-fascist organisations, and underpinned by 
a coherent logic firmly grounded in the radical remaking of social relations.13  José Luis 
Ledesma has developed this approach by profiling  the ‘faces of the repression’ and 
showing that in eastern Aragón the perpetrators of revolutionary violence were drawn 
from across the left and Republican organised political base, as well as from sectors that 
not been politically active before July 1936.  Crucially, Ledesma moves away from 
traditional interpretations that proportion blame for the violence almost solely upon 
the anarchist movement, demonstrating how competing groups used violence not only 
to eliminate perceived enemies, but also to open and secure ‘political spaces’ for 
themselves within the new order being constructed on Republican territory in the wake 
of the coup. Ledesma avoids reductionist readings which establish rigid connections 
between human actions and political militancy. As such, he does not shy away from 
examining the implication of members of moderate Republican political organisations 
in violent acts.14 The work of Alfonso Natividad Hernandis, which addresses post-coup 
violence in l’Horta Nord (Valencia), also points to this political and social heterogeneity 
amongst perpetrators who ‘shared a series of common sociocultural enemies’. He 
sustains that ‘both a Republican and a Socialist might try to eliminate [these enemies] to 
build a new society, even if these societies were very different from one another’. 15 
Perhaps most crucially, Ledesma also introduces important nuances into the 
long-established, comfortable idea that Republican state collapsed completely as a 
result of the coup, creating a power vacuum that was filled by ‘uncontrollable’ groups. 
Instead, he constructs a detailed account of the ‘fragmentation of power’ which took 
place on Republican territory. 16 He examines the process by which, with the Republic’s 
army and security services paralysed, fragmented but still partially intact in some 
places, ‘local powers, revolutionary organisations and even sectors of the State’ found 
themselves engaged in a chaotic competition to control repressive practices and 
administer ‘justice’. 17 These conclusions are supported by Fernando Jiménez Herrera, 
another of this new generation of historians of the repression, who has constructed a 
detailed picture of the overlapping and competing administrative and repressive 
actions carried out by newly-formed committees and militia groups, existing political 
centres and state bodies in the municipality of Vallecas in Madrid. His examination of 
the role of town councils fighting to cling on to authority in carrying out killings at the 
start of the conflict supports his assertion that the state, rather than ‘collapsing’, became 
‘just another actor in the fight for power’.18  
Ledesma has also examined the complex process by which the Republican 
authorities struggled to rebuild the splintered state machinery of coercion and the 
judicial system, attempting to stem the tide of popular violence by redirecting it into 
legal channels. At a local level, this delicate, obstacle-strewn process of negotiation and 
accommodation with groups of armed workers organised into committees and militia 
groups frequently implicated state actors even further in extrajudicial violence.  Paul 
Preston, whose research was described as biased, militant and lacking in balance by 
some of the contributors to the JCH forum, does not ignore or soften this implication.19  
The Spanish Holocaust, for instance, analyses the wave of brutal repression unleashed 
by the Comité Provincial de Investigación Pública, formed in Madrid by Director General 
of Security Manuel Muñoz in a failed attempt to incorporate representatives of workers 
organisations into state-sponsored judicial and coercive bodies. Preston also examines 
extrajudicial killings carried out from with the ranks of the capital’s police force-under-
reconstruction.20 Lucía Prieto Borrego and Encarnación Barranquero Texeira, who have 
examined the Republican authorities’ establishment of ‘popular tribunals’ in Malaga, 
similarly acknowledge that some of the new groups which emerged at the start of the 
war ‘enjoyed a measure of institutional support and a number of them even played a 
role in the government court system.’ 21 
The perspectives outlined above present a detailed and frank account of the 
fragmented Republican State’s implication in repression. However, their authors 
emphasise the Republican Government’s fundamental opposition to grassroots violence, 
outlining the authorities’ attempts to bring the wave of repression under control, a 
process which was virtually complete by mid-1937. In doing so, they underline the 
fundamental difference between violence in the Franco zone – which was encouraged, 
sanctioned and coordinated by the military and political high command and which 
lasted for the duration of the war and into the 1950s – and the violence which unfolded 
on Republican territory. 22 It is true that the marked tendency to view Republican 
violence in a comparative light, strongly present in historiography since the 1980s, has 
often worked to obscure its status a specific phenomenon with its own logics and 
meanings.23 However, in 2016 historians still need to insist upon this distinction for a 
number of reasons.  
Firstly,  a number of historians currently working both inside and outside Spain – 
some of whom contributed to the aforementioned JCH forum – continue to argue that 
repression in the Republican zone was the ‘exact flipside’ of Franco violence. They use 
this argument of ‘similarity’ to claim that the fundamental  cause of the violence was not 
the coup itself, but the ‘exclusionist’ discourse constructed by Socialist and Republican 
political leaders between 1931 and 1936. Indeed, Fernando del Rey has portrayed the 
coup as an excuse for left-wing activists to carry out an ‘ideological cleansing’ whose 
origins lay in the rhetoric of the radical sector of the Socialist movement.24 Similar 
arguments have been proposed by Julius Ruiz, a British historian of Francoist and 
Republican violence. Ruiz’s work had made some useful contributions to the task of 
deconstructing the image of the incontrolado and revealing the involvement of state 
agencies in revolutionary violence. However, his central contention that terror was as 
integral to the Republic’s war effort as it was to Franco’s, as well as his insistence that 
the bellicose discourse of the Republic’s political leaders provides the explanation for 
unrest and violence both before and after the coup, seems to ignore much of what is 
already widely known regarding the vast quantitative and qualitative differences 
between violence in the two zones, and about the Republican Government’s complete 
rejection of the violence unfolding on its territory.25   
These scholars are keen to stress their distance from Francoist discourses and 
their credentials as ‘objective’ historians. However, their interpretations do sometimes 
bear troubling similarities to old Francoist myths concerning the alleged collapse of law 
and order in Spain following the February 1936 Popular Front election victory, and the 
supposed imminence of a social revolution.  Both of these arguments were used by the 
Dictatorship and its historians to conflate the violence that occurred before and after 
the coup, justifying their military intervention as necessary to restore order to the 
country. However, as Eduardo González Calleja, one of the foremost specialists on 
political violence working in Spain today has demonstrated, the myth of ‘uncontrolled 
violence’ during the spring of 1936 is just that: while social turbulence and protest 
undoubtedly increased after the elections, the state remained firmly in control of its 
machinery of coercion. Indeed, the majority of those killed during the period died at the 
hands of the security forces themselves, rather than being killed by either left-wing or 
right-wing activists.26  
Francoist myths surrounding the spring of 1936 and the responsibility of the 
Republican Government for revolutionary violence are more overtly present today in 
the work of the pro-Franco historians who ignore the radically different circumstances 
of the periods of the pre-war and wartime Second Republic in order to suggest that the 
entire Republican experience was one of lawlessness, violence and destruction.27 These 
narratives are similarly evident in martyrological literature produced by religious 
personnel, lay Catholics and by the Spanish ecclesiastical authorities themselves. This 
literature, which is being published today in abundant quantities, records the deaths of 
the almost 7,000 religious personnel who fell victim to revolutionary violence. Its 
discourse traces its origins back to the Civil War and post-war period, and to the 
institutional Church’s unwavering support for Franco’s repressive project and its 
collaboration in the construction of the Francoist war effort as a ‘crusade’ against what 
it saw as the violent atheism of the Second Republic. The martyrologists’ portrayal of 
the Spanish Civil War as a holy battle between good and evil, and their disingenuous 
conflation of the secularising measures pursued by pre-war Republican governments 
with the anticlerical and revolutionary violence of the summer of 1936, demonstrate 
that some Catholic sectors’ readings of twentieth-century Spanish history are still 
underpinned by the Francoist ideas and discourses which the Church itself played a key 
role in forging.28  
The attitude of Spain’s current, ultraconservative ecclesiastical hierarchy 
regarding violence in both zones of Spain is demonstrated even more explicitly by the 
episcopate’s enthusiastic promotion of the beatifications of the ecclesiastical victims of 
violence in the Republican zone, a process which began in the late 1980s. The 
ecclesiastical hierarchy’s justification of this support revolves around the idea that the 
Church was nothing more than an innocent victim of the violence, an interpretation 
which ignores both its active role in the social and political conflicts of the 1930s and its 
legitimation of Francoist violence during the Civil War and Dictatorship.29  Significantly, 
this defence of the ‘martyred Church’ is accompanied by opposition to the activities of 
civic memory associations working to locate and commemorate the victims of Francoist 
repression. The official ecclesiastical position regarding these activities, and the 2007 
Historical Memory Law which established structures to fund them, is that they are 
‘reopening old wounds’.30  
This stance is more broadly significant because it is almost identical to that of 
Spain’s governing Popular Party and many of the conservative sectors which support it, 
who condemn any initiatives to investigate Francoist violence as wilful attempts to 
disrupt peaceful coexistence. Indeed, one of the contributors to the JCH forum echoed 
these sentiments, stating that: ‘the duty of the historian is not to revive and deepen the 
traumatic division of the Civil War, especially as these have been overcome by 
Spaniards for decades’.31  This position, of course, ignores the ongoing pain of thousands 
of families whose loved ones were murdered by the Franco regime and buried in 
unmarked graves. In a situation where the Dictatorship used the memory of 
revolutionary violence for decades  to stigmatise all the Republic’s supporters as 
violent, atheistic hordes unworthy of being commemorated or even remembered, 
historians’ task of deconstructing still-powerful Francoist narratives by conducting 
meticulous, well-documented, honest research into violence in the Republican zone is 
more necessary than ever.  
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